Unfair rewards, poorly performing organizations and perceptions of deservingness as explanations of diminished job performance
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Purpose This study aims to detail how employees’ experience of distributive injustice may compromise their job performance, with specific attention to how this detrimental process may be explained in part by their beliefs about organization-level underperformance and moderated by their own psychological entitlement. Design/methodology/approach The research hypotheses were tested with three-round, time-lagged data collected among employees and their supervisors. Findings A critical channel through which employees’ perceptions that their organization’s reward system is unfair translates into thwarted job performance is a conviction that their organization does not meet its own performance targets. As a mediator, such organizational underperformance beliefs have particularly salient effects on employees who believe they are more deserving than others. Practical implications This study gives HR managers insights into how they can reduce the danger that unfair reward practices escalate into a reduced propensity by employees to complete their job tasks diligently. HR managers should make employees aware of their possible entitlement and discourage them from expecting that things always must go their way. Originality/value This research unpacks the connection between distributive injustice and job performance, by delineating the unique roles of two pertinent factors (organizational underperformance beliefs and psychological entitlement) in this connection.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".