Bibliographic record
Abstract
SEER, 94, 4, October 2016 784 every reading list on contemporary Ukraine, but while it delivers a lot of what everyone needs to know, it does not provide everything. School of Politics and International Relations Richard Sakwa University of Kent Åslund, Anders. Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 2015. xix + 273 pp. Map. Figures. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Chronology. Index. $25.95:£24.50 (paperback). Anders Åslund is widely acknowledged as one of the world’s leading experts on the Ukrainian economy. This is a timely book for many reasons. It is important to know why the Yanukovych regime was so self-destructive economically. It is even more vital to disentangle the effects of the war in east Ukraine and the Russian trade war since 2013 from the long-term problems of the local economy in explaining the economic collapse of 2013–15. And it is most important to look at the underlying reasons for a quarter of a century of economic under-performance, and how that can be changed. There is an issue with compatibility with Åslund’s earlier works, particularly his How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy from 2009. Part of the story is of course regression under Yanukovych, who was elected in February 2010; but the book currently under review doesn’t really refer to the earlier volume. The new book makes claims like Ukraine built ‘a rent-seeking oligarchy that was never effectively challenged during Ukraine’s 23 years of independence from the Soviet Union’ before 2014 (p. 4); which may indeed be true, but Åslund does not revisit earlier arguments from 2009, such as Ukraine’s then ‘competitive oligarchy bred high growth and pluralism’ (How Ukraine…, p. 6) — at least before the rise of the Yanukovych ‘Family’. Time will tell whether some of the key judgements of this latest book are also premature: ‘this time is different in Ukraine’, ‘the power of the oligarchs has declined’, and ‘the threat of populism is also on the wane’ (pp. 22–32). One or two individual judgements may also raise eyebrows; such as the claim that Yuliya Tymoshenko as Prime Minister had no chance of making ‘any of the badly needed structural reforms’ in 2009, ‘in the face of united opposition from Yanukovych and Yushchenko’ (p. 75). If she had been bolder in partnership with the IMF, then the 2010 election might have been very different. But the heart of the book is its analysis of Ukraine’s rentier oligarchy, its corruption and its influence on bad policy-making. Åslund’s solutions are radical, but few would dispute the need for a decisive break with the REVIEWS 785 dysfunctional equilibrium of partial reform that has entrenched itself over the years. At the time of writing, February 2016, the new authorities were beset by scandals that demonstrated the power of the vicious circles and protective mechanisms that defended the old sistema. But drifting back into the old ways will be much more consequent than it was after the Orange Revolution in 2004. Whether Ukraine can win its (conventional) war against Russia’s ‘hybrid war’ in the east depends on whether it can win on the home front too. Åslund’s final warning is stark: ‘The new Ukrainian government is facing a tall order. No reformer has succeeded in doing everything, but this government needs to accomplish a great deal if Ukraine is to continue to exist as an independent state’ (p. 225). UCL SSEES Andrew Wilson Hønneland, Geir. Russia and the Arctic: Environment, Identity and Foreign Policy. Library of Arctic Studies. I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2016. xiv + 205 pp. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £64.00. This book begins with a question: what do the Russians want in the Arctic? The question is set in context: ‘The Arctic is getting warmer, in more than one way’ (p. 1). Suddenly, after a long period in which the Arctic was barely considered except perhaps by military strategists during the Cold War, it has become a centre of international concern not only because of the effects of global warming on its fragile environment but also for other...
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".