Bibliographic record
Abstract
David Berman has studied Berkeley for over fifty years and has published three original books on the Irish philosopher (1996, 1997, and 2005). His most recent book represents the ‘culmination’ (p. xi) of his scholarly work on Berkeley, as it condenses his final view. Part I is titled ‘Berkeley's Philosophy’ and consists of sixteen sections. The first three sections are contextual and introductory. From section four onwards, Berman develops his interpretation from the argument that what is essential to Berkeley's philosophy is his dualism. From this central thesis, he defends two main ideas: (i) there is no substance dualism in Berkeley (such as that of Descartes) but an epistemic or perceptual one (pp. 13–5), because for him there are no material things (there is no res extensa) and because all that exists are minds or perceivers and perceptions or the objects perceived by minds, each of these things ‘irreducible to one another’ (p. 14); (ii) it is an error to attribute a distinction between metaphysics and epistemology to Berkeley's philosophy. In Section 4, Berman also addresses the central problem in Berkeley's epistemology: ‘how we know our minds’ (pp. 17–8). This topic is closely related to Sections 5– 6, where the author rejects the monistic interpretation (‘everything that exists is mental or psychical’, p. 27) and its ramification in the phenomenalist interpretation (‘everything that exists is phenomena’, p. 28). For him, both readings are erroneous, although they are common among post-Berkeley philosophers such as Reid, Schopenhauer, Mill, Ayer, and others. The misunderstanding of considering Berkeley as a monist comes from the fact that most scholars assume that the only possible form of dualism is substance dualism, ignoring with it Berkeley's non-substantial dualism.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.014 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.006 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.017 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".