Continuous Authentication in the Digital Age: An Analysis of Reinforcement Learning and Behavioral Biometrics
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This article focuses on developing a continuous authentication system using behavioral biometrics to recognize users accessing computing devices. The user’s distinct behavioral biometric is captured through keystroke dynamics, and reward-based reinforcement learning (RL) ideas are applied to recognize them throughout the session. The suggested system adds an extra layer of security to traditional authentication methods, forming a robust continuous authentication system that can be added to static authentication systems. The methodology involves training a RL model to detect unusual user typing patterns and flag suspicious activity. Each user has an agent trained on their historical data, which is preprocessed and used to create episodes for the agent to learn from. The environment involves fetching observations and randomly corrupting them to learn out-of-order behavior. The observation vector includes both running features and summary features. The re-ward function is binary and minimalistic. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) model is used to encode the running features, and the Double Deep Q-Network (DDQN) algorithm with a fully connected neural network is used as the policy net. The evaluation achieved an average training accuracy and EER (equal error rate) of 94.7% and 0.0126 and test accuracy and ERR of 81.06% and 0.0323 for all users when the number of encoder features was increased. Therefore, it is concluded that by continuously learning and adapting to changing behavior patterns, this approach can provide more secure and personalized authentication, lowering the possibility of unauthorized access and cyberattacks. Overall, the use of reinforcement learning and behavioral biometrics for continuous authentication has the potential to significantly enhance security in the digital age and are effective in identifying each user.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".