Bibliographic record
Abstract
Fair division of resources emerges in a variety of different contexts in real-world problems, some of which can be seen through the lens of game theory. Many equilibrium notions for simple fair division problems with indivisible items have been considered, and many of these notions are hard to compute. Strategic fair division is a branch of fair division in which participants may act uncooperatively to maximize their utility. In the presence of participants who have strategic behavior, it is essential to have a suitable algorithm in place to allocate resources in a fair and equitable manner. We propose a new approach to solve strategic fair division problems where fairness is attained by finding a constrained Nash equilibrium in a specific game. We show that computational complexity barriers also hold. More broadly, the theoretical results of this paper could potentially be applied to related general game theory problems and complex fair division problems. Finally, we propose an algorithm for finding a constrained Nash equilibrium in the game that we introduce. Our focus will be on one particular meta-heuristic – the bus transportation algorithm – as an approach to improve the running time of the search.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".