Evaluating Security of MQTT Protocol in Internet of Things
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) has revolutionized the way people interact, communicate, and perform daily activities in various domains ranging from households to industries and cities. MQTT is one of the commonly adopted protocols for implementing IoT. However, IoT systems that are connected through MQTT are susceptible to security breaches as MQTT was not originally designed with security as a priority. The credentials and messages transmitted in plaintext by default, thereby compromising data confidentiality and integrity. This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the MQTT protocol, including experimentation on an MQTT system using various cryptographic implementations, such as AES-CBC, RSA, and ECC AES Hybrid Scheme, to assess the processing time and message size. The findings indicate that payload encryption increases processing time and message bytes. Among the cryptographic implementations, RSA incurs the highest processing time, followed by ECC AES Hybrid Scheme and AES- CBC. Furthermore, the study demonstrates the effectiveness of attack prevention between standard MQTT and secured MQTT implementations by simulating various IoT attacks, such as black-box penetration attack, identity spoofing, DoS attack, and MITM attack. The results and subsequent discussion provide insights that answer the research question, revealing the cryptographic algorithms that result in the most overhead on the standard MQTT implementation and their capacity to resist common attacks.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".