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Record W4389192465 · doi:10.22215/etd/2023-15730

On the Cognitive Basis of Phenomenal Representation

2023· dissertation· en· W4389192465 on OpenAlexaff
Aaron Nowaczek

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typedissertation
Languageen
FieldNeuroscience
TopicVisual perception and processing mechanisms
Canadian institutionsCarleton UniversityUniversité du Québec à Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCognitionCognitive psychologyStimulus (psychology)Inattentional blindnessRepresentation (politics)PsychologyExternalismCognitive sciencePerceptionPoliticsPolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Is attention necessary for phenomenal representation?Can a cognitive system phenomenally represent a stimulus without first paying attention to the stimulus?Within the literature on phenomenality and attention, one may identify two general camps.One camp argues for a negative answer and cites inattentional blindness studies as evidence.The second camp argues the opposite: that attention is unnecessary for phenomenal representation.Researchers in this camp cite studies using natural scenes and masked primes as evidence.However, there are some issues with the evidence for either position.The crucial issue is that researchers cannot guarantee their studies use tasks that fully occupy attention.Some attention might spill over from a distracting task to a critical image, which would mean that their studies do not do what they claim.As a result, a gap exists in our understanding of attention and phenomenal representation.This dissertation aims to close that gap by not only arguing that attention is unnecessary for phenomenal representation but also offering an alternative cognitive basis to ground phenomenal representation in cognition and representation called quality space cognition.I use evidence taken from the relevant literature and argue using traditional philosophical methods.Chapter 1 defines phenomenal representation and contrasts it with other forms of representation.A representation is phenomenal, I argue, when it represents a stimulus using traditional phenomenal properties and the relations among them so that the stimulus appears to the system as an object.Chapter 2 surveys the literature on attention and phenomenality and argues that our current understanding is inconclusive.iii Chapter 3 argues that attention is unnecessary for phenomenal representation and uses evidence from attention disorders, such as unilateral neglect, aphantasia, and phobias.Chapter 4 grounds pre-attentive phenomenal representation in a quality space, a model of cognition for the qualitative parts of phenomenal representation.The concluding chapter, Chapter 5, introduces some future empirical work to continue the research.In summation, I argue cognitive systems can phenomenally represent stimuli without first paying attention to the stimuli.Furthermore, the quality space approach models the cognitive and representational basis of phenomenal representation without attentional cognition.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.013
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.005
Threshold uncertainty score0.028

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.013
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.024
Scholarly communication0.0050.012
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.136
GPT teacher head0.397
Teacher spread0.261 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2023
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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