Metamodernism: The Future of Theory, By Jason Ānanda Josephson StormDiscourse and Ideology: A Critique of the Study of Culture, By Craig Martin

For over two decades now, theory in religious studies has been front and center. Those of a philosophical inclination may be forgiven to think that self-conscious theorizing is as important, if not more important, than studying the religions themselves. One can follow the musings of Mark C. Taylor, who argues that the necessities that arise from this configuration are owed, in large, to the “the close association between the processes of secularization and modernization, on the one hand, and Westernization, on the other” (“Introduction,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, edited by Mark C. Taylor [The University of Chicago Press, 1998], 4). When brought nearer to the specificities surrounding identity formation of the field, this translates into a self-reflexivity—sometimes critical, sometimes not—that imagines itself as the necessary other of the once reigning surrogate of theology in religious studies: phenomenology of religion. Despite their individual objectives and orientations, Craig Martin’s Discourse and Ideology: A Critique of the Study of Culture and Jason Storm’s Metamodernism: The Future of Theory share certain commonalities. To begin with, both embody a largely social scientific, characteristically North American manner of inquiry absorbed by the empirical. Each is topical in form as the authors wrestle philosophically with a milieu deeply impacted by the poststructuralist ethos, however broadly that designation is to be understood. “Metamodernism,” a term Storm proffers, connotes the negation of the poststructuralist negation without remainder, that is, without the triumphalism exclusive to “modernism” and “postmodernism” respectively. He gained his inspiration initially from and most significantly by Moyo Okediji in an effort to recover parts of these traditions in order to construct Storm’s own metamodern variant (5). Martin, on the other hand, is not concerned with a master category as such. His aim is to surface a poststructuralist empiricism, an approach aimed at purging objectivity in the human sciences of realist pretensions regarding the “gratuitous” Kantian thing-in-itself (3). The gravity and precarious nature of the claim, suggested by the conjunction in an introductory proclamation (“I’m a poststructuralist and an empiricist” [11, italics his]), is felt strongly throughout the book. Qualifications begin to peter out, however, as Martin, presumably, feels he has secured his case. Phrases and sentences such as the following eventually drop from view: “my own ravings, my own obsession” (13), “for my purposes” (21), “as I’m defining it” (29), “the poststructuralist approach I’m defending” (32), “poststructuralist (at least on my use of the term)” (38), “for us” (55), “to put it in my words” (60), “although my defense of anti-realism ultimately might not be persuasive to many readers” (70), “I do not pretend to be an orthodox Foucauldian” (77), and so on.

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