The Shadow of a Taxman: Who Funded the Irish Revolution, by R.J.C. Adams

R.J.C. Adams begins his book by calling attention to the extensive literature about the history of the Irish War of Independence, traceable at least to Sean O’Casey’s 1923 play The Shadow of a Gunman. However, he notes with some irony that until recently very few scholarly works have focused on ‘who paid for the gun …’ (p. 1) Adams’s book is the most recent of a small number of studies that attempt to explain how the Dáil Éireann government was financed during the almost three years of the Irish Revolution. Adams divides his book into two parts, the first focused on raising revenue within Ireland. Eamon de Valera, now Príomh-Aire, told the Dáil in April 1919, ‘It is obvious that the work of our Government cannot be carried on without funds’, and plans were laid for a National Loan to raise at least £250,000 through the sale of bonds. The appointment of Michael Collins as Minister of Finance was a major contribution to accomplishing this objective. Although largely remembered for his leadership as the director of military operations during the War for Independence, Collins came to his ministerial post as someone with experience in banking matters, having worked for some ten years in London banks and brokerage firms. The National Loan bonds were to be sold in denominations from £1 to £100 and were to pay 5 per cent interest. Adams shows that Collins organised a national campaign to promote sales of the bonds, relying largely on the existing Sinn Féin organisations around the country. Large bond notices were also planned for Irish newspapers, but those newspapers that printed them were suppressed by the British authorities—a gesture that in itself proved to be a conspicuous advertisement for the bonds. British authorities had largely ignored the activities of the Dáil, but tried to stop the sale of the bonds, arresting anyone found with receipts or bond certificates. Adams explains that, despite these punitive measures, Collins was able to enlist the services of commercial banks in Dublin, such as the Hibernian Bank and the Munster & Leinster Bank, to handle deposits and withdrawals with remarkably little cash seized by Crown forces. Adams records that at the close of the National Loan in July 1920 some £355,000 had been received, quoting Arthur Griffith as saying this was ‘one of the most extraordinary feats in the country’s history’ (p. 80). Perhaps even more extraordinary are the conclusions that Adams draws in studying the records of who purchased the bonds. Although farmers constituted roughly 44 per cent of the Irish population, they made up 74 per cent of the subscribers to the National Loan and paid 59 per cent of the cash contributed (pp. 107–9). These figures illustrate the wide popular support for the Dail government in the struggle for independence and particularly its strong rural base, Adams concludes.

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