Bibliographic record
Abstract
The materialist tradition challenges the conventional philosophical understanding that logic is the organon for both science and philosophy.Marx and Engels, building on the materialist tradition that can be traced back to the ancients, inaugurated the direct challenge in the nineteenth century.The dialectic of humanity and nature, they argued, was the matrix of all human culture including its philosophical and logical forms.But as suggestive and compelling as Marx's and Engels' bold thesis was, it would fall to twentieth century writers to flesh out the counter-claim that the material world is really the organon for logic.The logician John Dewey, building upon the naturalism and instrumentalism of American pragmatism, theorized the relationship between the continuum of science and the development of logical forms.And Evald Ilyenkov, writing a few decades later, argued that science and logic must conform to the dialectical character of the object world.In Dewey's writing epistemology is the organon for logic; in Ilyenkov ontology is the organon for logic; and thus in keeping with Marx and Engels both writers see logic as being effectively shaped by the material sphere.Neither writer, however, establishes a clear ontological philosophy commensurate with the claim that the world is dialectical, although Ilyenkov's writing is much more fecund and suggestive.Building on Ilyenkov, we argue that a theory of entification helps to illuminate claims about the dialectical character of the object world, drawing attention directly to the self-sameness and difference of entities, highlighting their abiding essence and evolutionary character, and so forth.Moreover, we conclude that a clearer philosophy of entification reveals the path through which the material world registers in the upper cultural echelons of science, philosophy, and logic, and helps to show how the dialectical epistemology of Dewey and the dialectical ontology of Ilyenkov complement each other within the materialist tradition.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.036 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.009 | 0.011 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".