The interplay between I and We intentionality
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract We and I intentionality appear to be two distinct forms of human intentionality, as one cannot be explained in terms of the other. We-intentionality is part of the psychological infrastructure at the basis of human cooperative behavior, while I-intentionality is potentially more related to competitive relationships with conspecifics. Our work tries to empirically address the relationship between these two forms of human intentionality as exhibited during the early stages of human development. The experimental setting consisted of four different games, two competitive and two cooperative. We focused our experiment on three age groups and schooling: Early Elementary School Children (mean = 5 years 6 months; σ = 4.2 months), Late Elementary School Children (mean = 9 years 4 months; σ = 7.5 months), and Adult University students (mean = 21 years; σ = 11 months). The key aspect of the investigation was that only one participant was informed of the game, rules, and reward. The second participant came to the set uninformed. It was the first participant's decision whether and how to engage the latter in the game. We were especially interested in the communicative behaviors: when and how the informed participant would share his or her information. We observed that the Adult University Informed participants shared their information with the Adult University Uninformed participants, while this almost never happened in Early Elementary School Children. Late Elementary School Children presented a split halfway between keeping and sharing the information. The results seem to support the hypothesis of a developmental relationship between the two forms of intentions. They also suggest that the two forms of intentionality are complementary. Each plays a specific role in human relationships with social and physical environments: the We-intentionality would establish the common ground within which the I-intentionality would manifest itself.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.019 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".