Bibliographic record
Abstract
First published in 1979, Political Manipulation and Administrative Power examines in detail some of the means by which elites in western-style democracies have established and maintained themselves in power. It describes how elites have manipulated the public by methods which run counter to the spirit and the letter of democracy, yet without overtly disrupting the democratic system. In exploring the relationship between political corruption and class interests, the author takes issue with the Marxist perspective to argue that the type of political manipulation under discussion, and its decline in some countries, cannot be explained by the economically dominant classes’ interests. She further contends that such manipulation cannot be explained by the characteristics of the rank-and-file public, such as lack of political awareness, poverty, and disorganization. She maintains that such manipulation can be best explained by certain characteristics of the ruling elites themselves and the power structures (especially administrative) they shape and head. Using an elitist perspective in conjunction with a structural functional one, she goes on to show that the decline of such practices in some countries more than in others can be explained by the normative codes and role definitions which, once adopted and institutionalized by the elites, act as a restraint on the manner in which they entrench themselves in power. A comparative study of Britain, the USA, Australia and Israel, this book is based on general principles which make its argument applicable to other western-style democracies. It will be a beneficial read for students and researchers of politics, comparative studies, and international politics.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.032 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.010 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".