Comparison of the Theory of Trust and Similar Institutions in Iranian and Common Law
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The theory of trust is one of the most important theories in the law of obligations and stands in contrast to the theory of will sovereignty. This theory has a direct relationship with good faith. The theory of trust contains specific elements that have sparked differing opinions in common law countries. The United States, Canada, and Australia have accepted it, while countries like England have rejected it, similarly to how they reject unilateral obligations. This theory shares common points with the principles of unjust enrichment and reliance on property or actions and has been studied in relation to the theory of consideration. However, the characteristics of this theory include unpredictability, lack of comprehensiveness, lack of explanatory power, the absence of a necessary link between trust and obligation, the imposition of liability without fault, ambiguity in the concept of trust, undesirable judicial outcomes, and disregard for moral virtues. As mentioned, in Iranian law, some rules, such as the principles of unjust enrichment and reliance, bear similarities to this theory in non-contractual liabilities. In contrast, in common law, this theory has been compared and analyzed alongside estoppel, good faith, and unilateral obligations. Therefore, the present research conducts a comparative study of the evolution and scope of the application of the theory of trust in the law of obligations in Iran and common law through an analytical and descriptive method. It concludes that the acceptance of the theory of trust in both common law and Iranian legal systems is subject to criticism and, despite its similarities to various institutions such as agency, unjust enrichment, and reliance, it is more frequently raised in the context of civil liability than in the realm of obligations.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.014 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".