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Record W4403095861 · doi:10.37417/r1nbfn13

Las relaciones entre el parlamento y las autoridades independientes: Sistema de nombramiento y control parlamentario

2024· book-chapter· es· W4403095861 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typebook-chapter
Languagees
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicComparative constitutional jurisprudence studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Sumario: 1. Introducción 2. Breve historia de las autoridades independientes 3. La regulación de las autoridades independientes en Alemania, Francia e Italia 4. Las anomalías del caso español 5. Conclusiones Bibliografía Ackerman, B., «The new separation of the powers», en Harvard Law Review, 2000, 3 (113), pp. 633–729.Alemán Merlo, S., Castellà Andreu, J. M., «El nombramiento de las au­toridades independientes. Lecciones a partir de la experiencia española y europea», I·CON, 4 (20), 2022, pp. 1526-1537.Alves, S., Capiau, J., y Sinclair, A., «Principles for the Independence of Competition Authorities», Competition Law International Journal, 1 (11), 2015, pp. 13-28.Avril, P., «L’introuvable contrôle parlementaire (suite)», Jus Politicum. Au­tour de la notion de Constitution, 3, 2009, pp. 1-7.Baamonde Gómez, L., «La nominación parlamentaria de autoridades del Estado. El bloque, el veto y la “cesta institucional”», Revista de Derecho Político, 113, 2022, pp. 71-93.Bernstein, M., Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955.Betancor Rodriguez, A., Las Administraciones Independientes, Madrid, Tecnos, 1994.Bickel, A., The Least Dangerous Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986.Breger, M. J. y Edles, G. J., Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.Bulmer, E., Independent Regulatory and Oversight (Fourth-Branch) Institu­tions, International Stockholm, International IDEA, 2019.Carmona Contreras, A., «Control parlamentario y designación de órganos constitucionales en España: teoría y práctica», Revista de las Cortes Ge­nerales, 113, 2022, pp. 245-273.Castellà, J. M., «La Aportación de la Comisión de Venecia a la Preservación del Estado de Derecho», Revista General de Derecho Constitucional, 38, 2023, pp. 26-27.Cuenca Miranda, A., «La Intervención parlamentaria en la designación de cargos públicos», Revista de las Cortes Generales, 113, 2022, pp. 275-303.Coen, D. y Thatcher, M., «Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies», Journal of Public Policy, 1 (28), 2008, pp. 859-872.de Miguel Barcena, J., «El Consejo Estatal de Medio Audiovisuales en España: de la irrelevancia institucional a la fusión de reguladores», en Ga­vara de Cara, C. (ed.): Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 81-109.De Somer, S., «The Europeanisation of the Law on National Independent Regulatory Authorities from a Vertical and Horizontal Perspective», Re­view of European Administrative Law, 2 (5), 2012, pp. 93-130.Fabbrini S., Vassallo S., Il governo. Gli esecutivi nelle democrazie contem­poranee, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1999.Foà, S., «La tendenziale indipendenza delle autorità di regolazione rispetto al Governo», Federalismi, 28, 2020, pp. 66-89.Fukuyama, F. y Grotto, A., «Comparative Media Regulation in the United States and Europe», en Persily, N. y Tucker, J. A. (eds.): Social Media and Democracy The State of the Field, Prospects for Reform, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 199-219.Garcia Llovet, E., «Autoridades administrativas independientes y estado de derecho», Revista de Administración Pública, 131, 1993, pp. 61-118.Ginsburg, T. y Huq A. Z., How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, Chica­go, University of Chicago Press, 2018.Ginsburg, T. y Elkins, Z., «Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts», Texas Law Review, 7 (87), 2009, pp. 1431-1461.Grasso, G., Le Autorità Amministrative Indipendenti della Repubblica. Tra Legittimità costituzionale e legittimazione democratica, Milano, Giuffrè, 2006.Griglio, E., Parliamentary Oversight of the Executives. Tools and Procedure in Europe, Oxford-Nueva York, Hart Publishing, 2021Hirschl, R., Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Boston, Harvard University Press, 2007.Kosař, D., Baroš, J. y Dufek, P., «The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Technocratic Governance and Populism», Eu­ropean Constitutional Law Review, 3 (15), 2019, pp. 427-461.Magide Herrero, M., Límites constitucionales de las Administraciones in­dependientes, Madrid, INAP, 2000.Majone, D., «Europe’s «Democratic Deficit»: the Question of Standards», European Law Journal, 1 (4), 1998, pp. 5-28.Mancini, P., Elogio della lottizzazione. La via italiana al pluralismo, Bari, Laterza, 2009.Manetti, M., «Autorità indipendenti: tre significati per una costituzionaliz­zazione» Politica del diritto, 4, 1997, pp. 657-684.Mateu Vilaseca, M., «Del CEMA (Consejo Estatal de los Medios Au­diovisuales) a la CNMC (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia): composición y funciones», en Gavara de Cara, C. (ed.): Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 53-80.Montero Pascal, J. J., La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Compe­tencia. Entre la actividad administrativa de regulación y el Derecho de la competencia, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2013.Montesquieu, C., De l’ésprit des lois (1748), Paris, Dalloz, 1958.Murray, C., «Human Rights Commission Et Al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions?», Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 2 (9), 2006, pp. 121-147.O’Donnell, G., «Delegative Democracy», Journal of Democracy, 1 (5), 1994, pp. 55-69.Pauner Chulvi, C., «La articulación del control parlamentario sobre los espacios libres de control gubernamental. Parlamento y Administraciones independientes» Teoría y realidad constitucional, 19, 2007, pp. 329-345.Potcheva, E. M., «Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual en Alemania», en Gavara de Cara, C. (ed.), Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 279-314.Rallo Lombarte, A., «Poderes neutrales exentos de control gubernamental: reflexiones constitucionales», Revista de las Cortes Generales, 36, 1995, pp. 105-136.Rallo Lombarte, A., La constitucionalidad de las autoridades independientes, Madrid, Tecnos, 2002.Roig i Batalla, A., «La autoridad independiente de control de los me­dios de comunicación audiovisual en Francia: el Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel», en Gavara de Cara, C. (ed.), Las autoridades indepen­dientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 267-288.Rousseau, D., La justice constitutionnelle en Europe, Paris, Montchrestien 1992.Sala Arquer, J. M., «El estado neutral. Contribución al estudio de las admi­nistraciones independientes», Revista Española de Derecho Administrati­vo, 42, 1984, pp. 401-422.Sajo, A., «Independent Regulatory Authorities as Constitutional Actors: A Comparative Perspective», Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eövös Nominatae - Sectio Iuridica, (48), 2007, pp. 5-51.Salvador Mártinez, M., Autoridades independientes. Un análisis compara­do de los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia y España, Barcelona, Ariel, 2002.Sartoretti, C. y De Folco, V., «Le autorità amministrative indipendenti in un’indagine comparata. Argomentazioni su problematiche contempora­nee», DPCE Online, 2 (47), 2021, pp. xxvii-xxx.Shapiro, M., «The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union», Journal of European Public Policy, 2 (4), 1997, pp. 276-291.Suteu, S., «The Populist Turn in Central and Eastern Europe: Is Deliberative Democracy (Part of) the Solution?», European Constitutional Law Review, 3 (15), 2019, pp. 488-518.Tushnet, M., «Institutions protecting constitutional democracy: Some con­ceptual and methodological preliminaries», University of Toronto Law Journal, 2 (70), 2020, pp. 95-106.Tushnet, M., The New Fourth Branch. Institutions for Protecting Constitutional De­mocracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021.Valcke, P. y Lambrecht, I., «The evolving scope of application of the AVMS Directive», en Parcu P. L. y Brogi E. (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Media Law and Policy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2021, pp. 282-302.Vibert, F., The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.Vintzel, C., Les armes du gouvernement dans la procédure législative. Etude comparée: Allemagne, France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Paris, Dalloz, 2011.Vírgala Foruria, E., La Constitución y las comisiones reguladoras de los servicios de red, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2004.Wils, W. P. J., «Independence of Competition Authorities: The Example of the EU and Its Member States», World Competition. Law and Economics Review, 2 (42), 2019, pp. 149-170.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Science and technology studies, Scholarly communication, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Science and technology studies, Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.904
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0020.003
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.006

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.321
Teacher spread0.299 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it