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Record W4403095861 · doi:10.37417/r1nbfn13

Las relaciones entre el parlamento y las autoridades independientes: Sistema de nombramiento y control parlamentario

2024· book-chapter· es· W4403095861 on OpenAlexaboutno aff

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typebook-chapter
Languagees
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicComparative constitutional jurisprudence studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Sumario: 1. Introducción 2. Breve historia de las autoridades independientes 3. La regulación de las autoridades independientes en Alemania, Francia e Italia 4. Las anomalías del caso español 5. Conclusiones Bibliografía Ackerman, B., «The new separation of the powers», en Harvard Law Review, 2000, 3 (113), pp. 633–729.Alemán Merlo, S., Castellà Andreu, J. M., «El nombramiento de las au­toridades independientes. Lecciones a partir de la experiencia española y europea», I·CON, 4 (20), 2022, pp. 1526-1537.Alves, S., Capiau, J., y Sinclair, A., «Principles for the Independence of Competition Authorities», Competition Law International Journal, 1 (11), 2015, pp. 13-28.Avril, P., «L’introuvable contrôle parlementaire (suite)», Jus Politicum. Au­tour de la notion de Constitution, 3, 2009, pp. 1-7.Baamonde Gómez, L., «La nominación parlamentaria de autoridades del Estado. El bloque, el veto y la “cesta institucional”», Revista de Derecho Político, 113, 2022, pp. 71-93.Bernstein, M., Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955.Betancor Rodriguez, A., Las Administraciones Independientes, Madrid, Tecnos, 1994.Bickel, A., The Least Dangerous Branch. The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986.Breger, M. J. y Edles, G. J., Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.Bulmer, E., Independent Regulatory and Oversight (Fourth-Branch) Institu­tions, International Stockholm, International IDEA, 2019.Carmona Contreras, A., «Control parlamentario y designación de órganos constitucionales en España: teoría y práctica», Revista de las Cortes Ge­nerales, 113, 2022, pp. 245-273.Castellà, J. M., «La Aportación de la Comisión de Venecia a la Preservación del Estado de Derecho», Revista General de Derecho Constitucional, 38, 2023, pp. 26-27.Cuenca Miranda, A., «La Intervención parlamentaria en la designación de cargos públicos», Revista de las Cortes Generales, 113, 2022, pp. 275-303.Coen, D. y Thatcher, M., «Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies», Journal of Public Policy, 1 (28), 2008, pp. 859-872.de Miguel Barcena, J., «El Consejo Estatal de Medio Audiovisuales en España: de la irrelevancia institucional a la fusión de reguladores», en Ga­vara de Cara, C. (ed.): Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 81-109.De Somer, S., «The Europeanisation of the Law on National Independent Regulatory Authorities from a Vertical and Horizontal Perspective», Re­view of European Administrative Law, 2 (5), 2012, pp. 93-130.Fabbrini S., Vassallo S., Il governo. Gli esecutivi nelle democrazie contem­poranee, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1999.Foà, S., «La tendenziale indipendenza delle autorità di regolazione rispetto al Governo», Federalismi, 28, 2020, pp. 66-89.Fukuyama, F. y Grotto, A., «Comparative Media Regulation in the United States and Europe», en Persily, N. y Tucker, J. A. (eds.): Social Media and Democracy The State of the Field, Prospects for Reform, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 199-219.Garcia Llovet, E., «Autoridades administrativas independientes y estado de derecho», Revista de Administración Pública, 131, 1993, pp. 61-118.Ginsburg, T. y Huq A. Z., How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, Chica­go, University of Chicago Press, 2018.Ginsburg, T. y Elkins, Z., «Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts», Texas Law Review, 7 (87), 2009, pp. 1431-1461.Grasso, G., Le Autorità Amministrative Indipendenti della Repubblica. Tra Legittimità costituzionale e legittimazione democratica, Milano, Giuffrè, 2006.Griglio, E., Parliamentary Oversight of the Executives. Tools and Procedure in Europe, Oxford-Nueva York, Hart Publishing, 2021Hirschl, R., Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Boston, Harvard University Press, 2007.Kosař, D., Baroš, J. y Dufek, P., «The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Technocratic Governance and Populism», Eu­ropean Constitutional Law Review, 3 (15), 2019, pp. 427-461.Magide Herrero, M., Límites constitucionales de las Administraciones in­dependientes, Madrid, INAP, 2000.Majone, D., «Europe’s «Democratic Deficit»: the Question of Standards», European Law Journal, 1 (4), 1998, pp. 5-28.Mancini, P., Elogio della lottizzazione. La via italiana al pluralismo, Bari, Laterza, 2009.Manetti, M., «Autorità indipendenti: tre significati per una costituzionaliz­zazione» Politica del diritto, 4, 1997, pp. 657-684.Mateu Vilaseca, M., «Del CEMA (Consejo Estatal de los Medios Au­diovisuales) a la CNMC (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia): composición y funciones», en Gavara de Cara, C. (ed.): Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 53-80.Montero Pascal, J. J., La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Compe­tencia. Entre la actividad administrativa de regulación y el Derecho de la competencia, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2013.Montesquieu, C., De l’ésprit des lois (1748), Paris, Dalloz, 1958.Murray, C., «Human Rights Commission Et Al: What is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions?», Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 2 (9), 2006, pp. 121-147.O’Donnell, G., «Delegative Democracy», Journal of Democracy, 1 (5), 1994, pp. 55-69.Pauner Chulvi, C., «La articulación del control parlamentario sobre los espacios libres de control gubernamental. Parlamento y Administraciones independientes» Teoría y realidad constitucional, 19, 2007, pp. 329-345.Potcheva, E. M., «Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual en Alemania», en Gavara de Cara, C. (ed.), Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 279-314.Rallo Lombarte, A., «Poderes neutrales exentos de control gubernamental: reflexiones constitucionales», Revista de las Cortes Generales, 36, 1995, pp. 105-136.Rallo Lombarte, A., La constitucionalidad de las autoridades independientes, Madrid, Tecnos, 2002.Roig i Batalla, A., «La autoridad independiente de control de los me­dios de comunicación audiovisual en Francia: el Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel», en Gavara de Cara, C. (ed.), Las autoridades indepen­dientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, 2013, pp. 267-288.Rousseau, D., La justice constitutionnelle en Europe, Paris, Montchrestien 1992.Sala Arquer, J. M., «El estado neutral. Contribución al estudio de las admi­nistraciones independientes», Revista Española de Derecho Administrati­vo, 42, 1984, pp. 401-422.Sajo, A., «Independent Regulatory Authorities as Constitutional Actors: A Comparative Perspective», Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eövös Nominatae - Sectio Iuridica, (48), 2007, pp. 5-51.Salvador Mártinez, M., Autoridades independientes. Un análisis compara­do de los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia y España, Barcelona, Ariel, 2002.Sartoretti, C. y De Folco, V., «Le autorità amministrative indipendenti in un’indagine comparata. Argomentazioni su problematiche contempora­nee», DPCE Online, 2 (47), 2021, pp. xxvii-xxx.Shapiro, M., «The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union», Journal of European Public Policy, 2 (4), 1997, pp. 276-291.Suteu, S., «The Populist Turn in Central and Eastern Europe: Is Deliberative Democracy (Part of) the Solution?», European Constitutional Law Review, 3 (15), 2019, pp. 488-518.Tushnet, M., «Institutions protecting constitutional democracy: Some con­ceptual and methodological preliminaries», University of Toronto Law Journal, 2 (70), 2020, pp. 95-106.Tushnet, M., The New Fourth Branch. Institutions for Protecting Constitutional De­mocracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021.Valcke, P. y Lambrecht, I., «The evolving scope of application of the AVMS Directive», en Parcu P. L. y Brogi E. (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Media Law and Policy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2021, pp. 282-302.Vibert, F., The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.Vintzel, C., Les armes du gouvernement dans la procédure législative. Etude comparée: Allemagne, France, Italie, Royaume-Uni, Paris, Dalloz, 2011.Vírgala Foruria, E., La Constitución y las comisiones reguladoras de los servicios de red, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2004.Wils, W. P. J., «Independence of Competition Authorities: The Example of the EU and Its Member States», World Competition. Law and Economics Review, 2 (42), 2019, pp. 149-170.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.015
Threshold uncertainty score0.049

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.003
Science and technology studies0.0030.009
Scholarly communication0.0090.005
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0150.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.321
Teacher spread0.299 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same topicComparative constitutional jurisprudence studiesFrench-language works237,207