Tax policy and gender equality: the impact of the fiscal system on women and men
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The author examines the impact of tax policy on gender equality, analyzing the differentiated impact of the fiscal system on women and men through the study of various tax instruments, such as direct and indirect taxes, family taxation mechanisms and the provision of tax benefits. The purpose of the study is to identify specific problems related to the unequal impact of tax instruments and to develop recommendations for improving the fiscal system that ensures equal economic opportunities for all citizens, regardless of gender. The subject of the study is the relationship between tax mechanisms (direct and indirect taxes, family taxation, tax benefits) and the economic status of women and men, as well as the identification of ways to improve the tax system taking into account gender factors. Research methods include economic analysis, comparative legal analysis, and statistical modeling. The author used both quantitative and qualitative methods, such as the analysis of tax statistics, the study of national and international legislation, the analysis of cases and international experience (Germany, France, USA, Canada, etc.), as well as the involvement of scientific publications and expert opinions. The results of the study show that despite the formal gender neutrality of tax legislation, its effects differ for women and men due to gender differences in income, employment, and the distribution of family responsibilities. Joint taxation of spouses, especially with a progressive tax scale, can reduce women's motivation to work due to the effect of the "second income tax". In turn, the separate taxation applied in a number of countries contributes to greater economic independence of women and stimulates their active participation in the economy. The article offers recommendations for improving the tax system, including the transition to separate taxation, the revision of tax benefits taking into account gender aspects, the conduct of a gender audit of the tax system and the introduction of gender-based budgeting. The author concludes that it is necessary to create a fair and efficient tax system that ensures equal opportunities for all citizens without providing unreasonable preferences to one gender.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".