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Record W4408339516 · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104402

Chronic monitoring for wrongdoing as a signal of immoral character

2025· article· en· W4408339516 on OpenAlexafffund
Nathan Dhaliwal, Fan Xuan Chen, Jane O’Reilly, Karl Aquino

Bibliographic record

VenueOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldNeuroscience
TopicPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British ColumbiaUniversity of OttawaUniversity of Saskatchewan
FundersSocial Sciences and Humanities Research CouncilSociale en Geesteswetenschappen, NWOSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
KeywordsWrongdoingPsychologyCharacter (mathematics)Social psychologyCriminologyPsychoanalysisEpistemologyPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

• We introduce chronic monitoring for wrongdoing as a novel factor influencing the reputation of third-party actors. • Third-party punishment is often seen as less moral when it is preceded by chronic monitoring for wrongdoing. • Chronic monitoring for wrongdoing signals competitive-leveling motives and a tendency to ascribe hostile intentions to others. • We ground our research in scholarship explaining why third-party punishment signals cooperative intent. Punishing wrongdoing can sometimes have reputational benefits. But what do people think of those who regularly monitor their environment for signs of wrongdoing? Drawing on the concept of workplace vigilantism, we posit that acts of monitoring in workplace settings serve as negative cues of one’s moral character. In particular, we propose that chronically monitoring for signs of wrongdoing signals that an individual is driven by retributive and competitive leveling motives as well as a tendency to ascribe hostile motives to others. We examine this idea across six studies (and three supplementary studies). In Study 1, we find that employees have largely negative impressions of individuals who vigilantly monitor and reprimand wrongdoings at work. In Study 2, we find that punishers are seen as less moral when their acts of punishment are preceded by chronic monitoring for wrongdoing. In Study 3, we find that punishers who engage in chronic monitoring are seen as possessing heightened retributive and competitive leveling motives. In Study 4, we find that the reputational costs of chronic monitoring persist even when the violation is addressed in a courteous manner and that chronic monitoring signals that one ascribes hostile intentions to others. In Study 5, we identify an individual difference moderator, showing that negative judgments of workplace vigilantes are attenuated when observers share similar vigilante tendencies. Finally, in Study 6, we find that the reputational costs that result from chronic monitoring are observed across an array of workplace violations, including when the violation is of considerable organizational importance. Together, our results demonstrate that the perceived moral character of a punisher can hinge on whether monitoring for wrongdoing precedes such punitive acts.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Bench or experimental · Consensus signal: Bench or experimental
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.074
Threshold uncertainty score0.392

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.063
GPT teacher head0.342
Teacher spread0.279 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designBench or experimental
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2025
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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