Bibliographic record
Abstract
A group of individuals has to choose an alternative. The individuals disagree about the desirability of the options; their preferences are known. Does a mechanism exist to select an alternative that depends on the individuals' preferences in a reasonable fashion? If only the individuals' ordinal preferences are known, then when the number of alternatives is two, majority voting is the only mechanism that satisfies a short list of appealing properties. When there are three or more alternatives, the existence of an alternative that beats head-to-head every other alternative, known as a Condorcet winner, is significant. If every collective choice problem that the individuals may face has a Condorcet winner, then the mechanism that selects that alternative is the only one that satisfies a short list of attractive properties. Otherwise, no such mechanism generally exists. A related question is whether a mapping exists from profiles of the individuals' preference relations to a preference relation for the group that satisfies some reasonable properties. If for every profile of preference relations that is possible for the group a Condorcet winner exists, then such a mapping associates with each profile of preference relations the preference relation in which one alternative is preferred to another if and only if it is preferred by a majority of individuals. If all profiles of logically possible preference relations are possible, no such mapping exists. If the individuals' preference intensities are known and can be compared then the only ordering of welfare profiles that satisfies a specific equity property ranks these profiles according to the welfare of the worst-off individual. If welfare differences, but not levels, can be compared across individuals, then the utilitarian ordering results.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.021 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".