Bibliographic record
Abstract
The question as to whether imaginative experience involves phenomenal presence is increasingly a subject of philosophical debate. In contrast to many contemporary thinkers who hold that waking imaginative experience and dreaming involve a feeling of presence, Jean-Paul Sartre (1940/2004, 1936/2012) argues that the phenomenology of presence accompanies perception only. Sartre thus rejects both that there is such a thing as “imaginative presence” and that dreaming involves the phenomenology of presence or a sense of immersion in a spatiotemporal dreamscape. This position puts him at odds with Amy Kind (2018) who holds that the imagination furnishes a sense of “presence in absence,” and Jennifer Windt (2018) and Michael Barkasi (2021), among others, who hold that dreaming involves a feeling of immersion in an imagined spatiotemporal dreamscape. I argue that Sartre’s position on presence emerges from his theory of perception that shares key objectives with contemporary naïve realism, and that his rejection of imaginative presence is consistent with the reasons why a contemporary naïve realist or relationalist would also reject the concept. This paper explains Sartre’s theory of phenomenal presence in the context of his theory of perception and contrasts his position on why a dreamer lacks a true sense of immersion in a dreamscape with the views of Windt and Barkasi.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.022 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".