Bibliographic record
Abstract
In July 2001, an innovative Public Private Partnership (PPP) was signed for National Air Traffic Services Ltd (NATS), the monopoly provider of air traffic control for aircraft flying over the UK. The NATS PPP is interesting in policy terms as other national air traffic control organisations are part of government, except NavCan, a Canadian trust with the power to set its own prices, and Airways New Zealand, a state owned company that receives no government support. The UK Government wanted to reform NATS and ensure that it had access to sufficient funds for capital investment. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, air traffic volume fell considerably, particularly across the North Atlantic, which reduced NATS' income and increased uncertainty regarding long-term growth in air traffic. It was difficult for NATS to respond quickly to revenue reductions as the bulk of its costs are fixed and its work force highly specialised. The banks providing NATS' acquisition facility were concerned that NATS would not be able to meet its debt service obligations in the period 2005-2010. Hence the banks stopped NATS from borrowing from a #630 million capital facility they also provided. In these circumstances, NATS had little alternative to applying to its regulator, the CAA, in February 2002 for a real price increase (9% over the period 2003-2005). In March 2003, the CAA determined that a 6% real price reduction over the period was most appropriate in the changed circumstances. Following detailed consideration of all options to strengthen NATS' financial position, a 'Composite Solution' was agreed in March 2003 including BAA and Government investment of #130 million, a 12% uplift in NATS' Regulatory Asset Base, a looser price cap, volume risk sharing with NATS and a regulatory policy statement. For the covering abstract see ITRD E126595.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.031 | 0.008 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".