Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This chapter describes how the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 marked a dramatic change in the evolution of the Unites States (US) railroad industry. After several decades of regulatory control over virtually every aspect of their economic operations, the federal government allowed rail carriers to abandon passenger service and created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, which is called Amtrak. The service began operating in 1971. Nearly a decade later, freight operations were substantially deregulated and railroads were given the freedom to establish rates, within broad limits, for the cargo they transported. They were able to abandon unprofitable routes and consolidate with other carriers in a much greater degree than in the past. Demand for rail passenger transportation had been declining form some time and the railroad industry and policymakers believed that this unprofitable service was contributing to rail’s deteriorating financial performance. However, relieving rail of passenger traffic did not significantly improve the bottom line, thus the stakes for freight operations in the policy were huge. Many industry observers feared that if the industry could not substantially increase its rate of return, if faced a real possibility of becoming nationalized. Moreover, if rail freight deregulation failed in the US it was unlikely that any other country would try this experiment. Today, countries such as Canada and, to some extent, Australia have deregulated their rail systems and most other countries are considering it. Apparently, other nations have interpreted the US railroad deregulation experiment as a success. The objective of this chapter is to address the following questions. What aspects of the policy worked and who benefited? What parts were less successful and who was harmed? What further steps can be taken to enhance industry performance under deregulation?
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it