The British Empire on the Western Front: A Transnational Study of the 62nd West Riding Division and the Canadian 4th Division

This dissertation is a detailed transnational comparative analysis focusing on two military units representing notably different societies, though ones steeped in similar military and cultural traditions. This project compared and contrasted training, leadership and battlefield performance of a division from each of the British and Canadian Expeditionary Forces during the First World War. The Canadian division selected was the 4th, formed in April of 1916 from a mix of units already training in England as reserve battalions as well as others sent from Canada. The Canadian 4th Division’s first encounter with the Germans came in the late fall of 1916 on the Somme, and from 1917 until the end of the war it fought continuously with the Canadian Corps in every major operation in which the latter was involved, playing a central role in all of these. The second unit examined was the British 62nd Division, authorized by the War Office in late 1915 to draw upon recruits from northern England. It was part of what was known as the Second Line Territorials. The 62nd Division sailed for France in January 1917, and from the spring onward also fought continuously until the end of the war. The questions underlying this research are twofold: based on the experience of these two infantry divisions, how did the two armies attempt to form effective fighting forces during the war from little more than enthusiastic amateur warriors, and were they successful in doing so. Secondarily, were there significant differences in the processes employed and did these differences manifest themselves in battlefield superiority of one Expeditionary Force over the other. In fact the research clearly indicates that both the Canadians and British ultimately were successful in overcoming the daunting challenge that they faced, and that the keys to doing so were installing capable leadership at the most senior levels of command in combination with thorough training based on an appropriate tactical doctrine. Furthermore, while differences certainly existed in approaches and performance, it was the similarities in how the two Expeditionary Forces prepared for and waged war which predominated. In the end these two divisions embraced similar training and battlefield tactics, benefited from like (and capable) styles of command, and underwent a broadly comparable evolution. Most importantly, after an inevitable – but remarkably brief - period of ‘learning’ at the Front, they became consistently effective combat divisions.

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