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Record W6999361392

Commentary on Alex Barber, “Concepts, Conceptions and Conceptual Change”. Technical Report 2001-01

2001· other· en· W6999361392 on OpenAlexaff

Bibliographic record

VenueCarleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · 2001
Typeother
Languageen
Field
Topic
Canadian institutionsCarleton University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCircumstantial evidenceSet (abstract data type)Representation (politics)Identity (music)TSG101Identification (biology)
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The purpose of Barber’s paper is to suggest that developmental psychologists who \nare committed to the popular theory-theory of conceptual content should adopt a new \nvariant known as entrenchment theory, that will be immune to some of the philosophical \nchallenges that plague the theory-theory. \nThe theory-theory of concepts says that a mental representation expresses some \nconcept when: a) that mental representation occurs in a well-defined set of stored \npropositions (beliefs), and b) this set of stored propositions are, as Barber puts it, \n“characteristic” of the concept. (p. 2) The unrestricted conception-conception says that \nevery single belief a person has that involves some representation is relevant in \ndetermining which concept that representation expresses. So the theory-theory is a \nrestriction of the conception-conception because it identifies a subset of core beliefs \ninvolving a representation R, namely the theoretical ones (whatever that may mean), and \nclaims that only these theoretical beliefs, and not any others, determine the identity of the \nconcept expressed by R. \nEntrenchment theory also places a restriction on which beliefs are relevant to the \ncontent of a representation, but it does so in a way that is different in two respects. First, \nand most importantly, rather than determining whether a belief is part of a theory, we use the level of entrenchment of the representation in the belief to determine whether it is \ncentral or not. Second, while the theory-theory encourages us to make a binary distinction \nbetween beliefs that do or do not bear on the identity of a concept, entrenchment (I \nbelieve) necessarily makes a fuzzy distinction. Those beliefs in which a representation R \nis more entrenched have a stronger bearing on the identity of the concept expressed by R. \nThose beliefs in which R is less entrenched have a weaker bearing. \nR is more entrenched in belief A than belief B if giving up or revising belief A \nwould be more epistemically traumatic than giving up or revising belief B. Giving up a \nbelief will be more epistemically traumatic the more far reaching the implications for \nevidence are. Barber remarks that, at least for natural kind concepts, demonstrative and \nlinguistic beliefs will tend to be more entrenched than beliefs about theoretical origin or \nstructure. This pattern may be reversed for more purely theoretical concepts. (p. 14)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.041
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Commentary · Consensus signal: Commentary
Teacher disagreement score0.082
Threshold uncertainty score0.164

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.041
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.004
Science and technology studies0.0140.008
Scholarly communication0.0120.018
Open science0.0070.006
Research integrity0.0300.033
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0280.020

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.020
GPT teacher head0.226
Teacher spread0.206 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreCommentary

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2001
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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