Bibliographic record
Abstract
George Berkeley (1685-1753) defends immaterialism, the view that there is no such thing as matter. In place of matter, what exists are only minds and ideas. Berkeley also styles himself a defender of common sense. From early on many of Berkeley's readers doubted that these two commitments could be reconciled. I consider Berkeley's joint commitment to immaterialism and common sense in respect of two philosophical theses. (1) Berkeley argues against a version of scepticism that bodies are single collections, constituted by many ideas placed in certain relations, and veridically sensed by finite minds. I identify these collections as Berkeley's enigmatic archetypes. (2) Berkeley argues that finite minds are able to act causally upon their own bodies by nothing more than an act of will. Both of these theses are defended in the context of immaterialism, and Berkeley persuasively presents them as elements of common sense. I reconstruct Berkeley's arguments for these theses, and suggest that he succeeds in reconciling immaterialism and common sense in these areas. My account draws on previous research, but I introduce a single mechanism to understand both theses. I call this mechanism overlap. On Berkeley's view, finite minds represent bodies by constructing representing-collections that are intended to resemble body-collections. However, these representing-collections overlap with body-collections, meaning that they share members which are numerically the same. My account of (1) depends on the fact that sensed ideas are in the overlapping area, and therefore represent the body-collection exactly as it is. My account of (2) depends on supposing that the causal powers of finite minds are exercised on ideas in the area of overlap, and thus they act on ideas that are accessible to them but are also constituent parts of bodies.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.016 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.022 | 0.006 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".