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Record W7010551188

The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty

2025· article· en· W7010551188 on OpenAlexaboutno aff

Bibliographic record

VenueeYLS (Yale Law School) · 2025
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEnvironmental Science
TopicInternational Maritime Law Issues
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsRatificationTreatyObligationCustomary international lawInternational lawNegotiationVienna Convention on the Law of TreatiesArms controlSettlement (finance)
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

There are currently two major international agreements of the United States which have been signed by the parties and transmitted by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent: the Treaty with the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as SALT II, and the Agreement with Canada on East Coast Fishery Resources and the accompanying Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area. Both agreements were signed after lengthy and complex negotiations. Both agreements are extremely detailed and represent a delicate balancing of the interests of the nations involved. Already there have been considerable delays in the ratification of both agreements. Perhaps neither agreement will be ratified. The President, however, continues to insist that ratification of both agreements is in the national interest, and eventual favorable action on them is still possible. Most contemporary treaties provide that they will enter into force only upon ratification by the states that are to become parties to the agreement. There is growing agreement that general international law imposes on the signatories to an unratified treaty the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of that treaty prior to its entry into force. Once viewed as a moral admonition this obligation has come increasingly to be regarded as legal in nature. The desirability of such a principle is of course evident. The long and complicated process of negotiation during which each state may have made numerous concessions should be protected, especially where a signed agreement is the result. Furthermore, during negotiations the states may have refrained from taking certain actions—heavy fishing of certain stocks or the development of new weapons systems for example—because negotiations were pending. This self-restraint in expectation of a binding agreement should be encouraged. It is the thesis of this Article that general international law imposes on the signatories to a treaty the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of that treaty prior to its entry into force. Decisional law, state practice, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties all support this proposition. The obligation has a firm theoretical basis in the general principle of abuse of rights. Finally, after examining the existence and nature of the obligation, the Article concludes with a discussion of the content of the obligation and attempts to discern its contours and extent.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.023
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.043
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.030
Threshold uncertainty score0.123

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0230.043
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.004
Science and technology studies0.0110.018
Scholarly communication0.0230.011
Open science0.0030.009
Research integrity0.0170.020
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0300.011

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.008
GPT teacher head0.259
Teacher spread0.251 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations8
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueeYLS (Yale Law School)Same topicInternational Maritime Law IssuesFrench-language works237,207