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Record W7028029144

Electoral Systems and their Effect on the Survival of Minority and Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

2013· other· en· W7028029144 on OpenAlexaffabout

Bibliographic record

VenueuO Research (University of Ottawa) · 2013
Typeother
Languageen
FieldMedicine
TopicPrenatal Screening and Diagnostics
Canadian institutionsGlobal Affairs Canada
Fundersnot available
KeywordsElectoral systemIncentiveGovernment (linguistics)Extant taxonCorporate governanceElectoral reformCabinet (room)Public opinion
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Recent electoral reforms in New Zealand and two devolved sub‐national parliaments in the U.K., coupled with the widespread fragmentation of party systems in Western democracies and shifts toward greater electoral volatility, give rise to the need to understand the effects of electoral systems on the incentives leading parties to cooperate (or not) with one another, and the results for government survival, especially under the circumstance of “hung parliaments,” where no party holds a legislative majority. This study is especially germane in the Canadian context, where an extended period of minority governance has renewed the debate about whether to reform the country’s electoral system to make it more proportional. The two main approaches in the extant literature on cabinet termination – the empirical “events history” strand and the rational‐choice theoretical models – remain to be fully unified, hampering the proper evaluation of hypothesized causal mechanisms linking public opinion shocks – and the systematic effects electoral systems have on them – to government survival outcomes. This paper looks at the recent evolution of the literature on government duration, focusing specifically on determining whether electoral systems alter the incentives leading to government termination in hung parliaments sufficiently to reduce the length of government survival. The literature to date remains insufficiently specified to draw strong conclusions about the effect of electoral systems on the stability of individual minority or coalition governments. Thus, I propose reworking some assumptions in theoretical models of government termination dealing with public opinion shocks. I also recommend that a large‐N statistical analysis of termination hazard rates of the type used by Lanny Martin be carried out using electoral system as the explanatory variable but limiting the sample to minority and coalition governments.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.015
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.021
Threshold uncertainty score0.041

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.015
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.002
Scholarly communication0.0030.001
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0100.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.281
Teacher spread0.243 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2013
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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