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Record W7033222976

Power and Pay in the C-Suite

2021· article· en· W7033222976 on OpenAlexaboutno aff

Bibliographic record

VenueeYLS (Yale Law School) · 2021
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldMaterials Science
TopicDiatoms and Algae Research
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsExecutive compensationCorporate governancePosition (finance)Compensation (psychology)Power (physics)Glass ceilingQuarter (Canadian coin)Ceiling (cloud)
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

(Excerpt) The debate over executive pay has gripped corporate law scholars, regulators, and the national public for decades. A C-Suite position provides uniquely lucrative financial benefits to executives, especially to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Over the past few decades, CEO pay has risen spectacularly, as has debate regarding why this has occurred and whether policy should or can correct it. The reasons why CEO pay has increased exponentially in the last 30 years are complex, and the solutions for reigning in executive compensation have been incomplete at best. Yet one glaring fact about the C-Suite eludes much of the corporate governance literature and executive compensation policy reforms and proposals: the C-Suite, particularly the CEO role, has long been and continues to be dominated by men. Despite making up half the workforce, few women lead companies in corporate America. Less than 6% of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are women, and women make up less than a quarter of C-level executives. Furthermore, few of the executive positions that traditionally lead to CEO roles are occupied by women. As the Wall Street Journal reported in 2020, for women, “the barrier isn’t only a glass ceiling at the very top, but also an invisible wall that sidelines them from the kinds of roles that have been traditional stepping stones to the CEO position.” Instead, women find themselves in “pink collar” C-Suite roles, such as head of human resources or legal. Not only do such positions rarely lead to the top, but they rarely constitute the highest compensated positions within corporations. Ample evidence shows that when women come to dominate a profession, the salary of that profession drops. This is particularly true in high-paid white-collar jobs. With this Essay, we pose the question of whether the opposite proves equally true: as men dominate a profession, does the salary of that profession rise? As corporate scholars, we seek to understand how the pinnacle of the corporation—the CEO position—is both male and uniquely well-remunerated. Might masculinity be the culprit behind increasingly outrageous CEO compensation packages? This Essay begins to explore the correlation between executive compensation and men’s domination over senior executive roles, focusing on the CEO position. We delve into various theories that could help explain why men dominate the most lucrative role in corporate America. We argue that law and corporate governance need to account for these theories in designing solutions that address gender disparity in the CEO role.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.027
Threshold uncertainty score0.091

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0050.008
Scholarly communication0.0070.004
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0040.005
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0270.004

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.015
GPT teacher head0.274
Teacher spread0.260 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2021
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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