Can money buy access? Political finance contributions and the impact on interest group access to legislative committees in Australia, Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Western governments continue to be marred with campaign contribution scandals and accusations of permitting wealthy donors’ undue political influence. Yet, current literature on political finance has not found consistent or conclusive evidence to suggest political finance donors receive advantages in the public policy process. However, existing studies have focused heavily on the later stages of the policy process and often use the United States as a sole case study. This thesis addresses key gaps in the literature by asking whether political finance donations can impact interest group access to legislative committees in four countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Existing theories on financial dependence and corporate lobbying advantage were used to create new frameworks to examine their impact on interest group access to legislative committees. By examining the impact of political finance at the consultation stage of the policy process, it focuses on an understudied but crucial point of access characterised by low public visibility but a high potential for policy influence. The thesis finds evidence to suggest contributions could give interest groups better access to legislative committees but only in certain countries. Associations between political finance contributions and privileged access were strongest in Australia, which has a lax approach to political finance regulation. Moreover, it also finds evidence of corporate dominance and an overall lack of witness diversity in committee hearings. The findings helped broaden our understanding of political finance and elite influence within the agenda-setting and consultation process.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".