The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952â1971
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Since the end of the Second World War, military assistance has emerged as an important instrument of international diplomacy. Initially employed by the United States in Europe, Latin America and Asia for a variety of economic and political reasons in the mid-1940s, by the end of the decade American military assistance had been fashioned into a coherent program “whose principal goal was the containment of Communist expansion.” By the mid-1950s, both the Soviet Union and Communist China had responded with their own assistance programs designed to woo the developing states of Asia and Africa. As Britain and France dissolved their colonial empires in the late 1950s, they too chose military aid as an effective way to maintain their links with the post-colonial state and to demonstrate their continued capacity to pursue independent global initiatives. Other states were also attracted by this kind of aid. West Germany, for example, began distributing military assistance in 1960 as part of its efforts to garner international support for its claim to sovereignty.\nCanada’s decision to supply small amounts of military assistance to the developing world owed relatively little to the cold war calculations of the superpowers and the considerations of national prestige that motivated other donors. Though Canadian diplomats recognized the benefits that military assistance might bring to the western world in the early 1950s, they were not especially anxious to divert scarce resources away from Europe towards the handful of small African and Asian states requesting aid. This was particularly true when any Canadian venture was likely to duplicate Washington’s substantial efforts to secure regional allies with promises of military assistance. As a consequence, the Department of External Affairs wasted little time and effort in convincing a reluctant Department of National Defence to accept military assistance as part of its mandate.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.010 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".