142 The Economic Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty Notes
Bibliographic record
Abstract
2. The Department of Finance (1991c) has prepared a useful study of economic linkages among provinces which also examines trade flows. 3. Data on debt of other countries are taken from IMF (1990) and World Bank (1990). 4. The unpublished data on Quebec local government debt in 1990were provided by the Public Institutions Division of Statistics Canada. 5. Montmarquette and Dallaire (1980) examined the increase in differ-entials in interest rate in Quebec and Ontario bonds after the 1976 I PQ election using econometric techniques. Their conclusions were that the present value of the additional financing costs was 1.22percent of the $2,656million in borrowings over the N ovem-ber 1976 to February 1979 period and that it took two and a half years for the difference in financing costs to disappear. Boothe and Harris (1991, p.21) attempted to isolate sovereign risk pre-miums by comparingU'S. pay bonds for Canada, Alberta, B.C. Hydro, Hydro-Quebec, and Ontario with a U.S. Treasury bond of comparable maturity and coupon over the 1986to 1991period. While the risk premium has narrowed since the beginning of the year, Quebec-Hydro bonds, which in March 1991 were 100basis points over U.S. Treasury's and 80 basis point over Canada's, traded at the highest risk premium since early 1990 of all the bonds considered. 6. Murray Smith estimates that the tariff equivalent of the dairy supply management regime is 50 to 10 percent (Smith, 1991, p.5). Chapter 5 The bottom line for Quebec sovereignty Canada's prosperity threatened by Quebec sovereignty QUEBEC SOVEREIGNTY HAS MANY possibly dire economic conse-quences for Canada, especially for Quebec. Few would deny that Canada has been an economic success story. Intemationalleaders such as U.S. President George Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl have taken the unusual step of expressing their concerns about a
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.051 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".