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Record W7117260517 · doi:10.5267/j.ijiec.2025.10.006

Dynamic optimization model of carbon emission allocation in agricultural product supply chain based on differential game theory

2025· article· W7117260517 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Jing Chen

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations · 2025
Typearticle
Language
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicSustainable Supply Chain Management
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsGoodwillProfit (economics)Supply chainGame theoryAgricultureSubsidyEmissions tradingReduction (mathematics)Product (mathematics)

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

To effectively balance emission reduction and preservation in the agricultural product sales system, this study models the carbon emission allocation of the agricultural product supply chain based on differential game theory. Starting from decentralized and centralized strategies without subsidies, research and modeling are conducted on the influencing factors of emission reduction, publicity, and preservation. Secondly, considering the scenario of government subsidies, the research analyzes the dynamic impact of different emission reduction, publicity, and preservation measures on the operation of the system. In the unsubsidized analysis model, the trajectory of goodwill shows variability, while the trajectory of freshness and emission reduction is mainly monotonic. In addition, freshness preference can enhance emission reduction decisions, and centralized strategies are superior to decentralized strategies in emission reduction. The increase in goodwill preference enhances the preservation, emission reduction, and sales status variables of agricultural products, but the centralized strategy is better than the decentralized strategy. Under the bilateral coordination mechanism, the maximum profit of the centralized strategy and bidirectional cost coordination mechanism system is 4350. In addition, under the two-way cost coordination mechanism, both retailers and suppliers have the highest profits, which are 1950 and 2352 respectively. In subsidy analysis, when the profit ratio is 0.5, the benefits of retailers and sellers reach equilibrium. In addition, bilateral coordination mechanisms have better system economic benefits, environmental benefits, and social welfare. This study is beneficial for improving carbon emissions from agricultural products and enhancing the effectiveness of agricultural product market development. This study provides technical support for agricultural emissions reduction and optimization of agricultural product supply chains.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.037
Threshold uncertainty score0.074

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0020.002
Open science0.0020.001
Research integrity0.0020.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.009
GPT teacher head0.223
Teacher spread0.213 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2025
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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