Thinking as a Mere Citizen of the World: Kantian Morality in a Pluralist Frame
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This dissertation argues that Kantian morality is more compatible with cultural pluralism than has thus far been acknowledged. Cultural pluralism denotes a normative commitment to the idea that we ought to uphold diversity and protect the rights of individuals within a given society to hold a multiplicity of divergent views, beliefs, and values. I argue that cultural pluralism should also be understood as being invested in certain basic liberal values and a concern for protecting fundamental human rights. As such, the pluralist needs a moral theory that balances the commitment to protecting diversity with the commitment to protecting human rights and provides a way of determining the appropriate limits of toleration. While moral relativism can be seen as a natural entailment of cultural pluralism, the kind of moral theory that the pluralist needs cannot be provided by relativism. I argue that there is good reason for the cultural pluralist to consider Kantian morality as a viable and compelling alternative. I do so by developing and clarifying elements of Kant’s thought which are often mischaracterized, oversimplified, or overlooked when discussing his moral theory, including egoism, broad-mindedness, the relationship between culture and practical judgment, and the importance of community in our moral lives. I attend to these elements with the dual aim of clarifying what Kant's position is and exploring which entailments might reasonably be drawn from his thought and developed further. In contrast with many stereotypical views of Kant’s moral system, I hold that his approach balances objectivity of principles with an awareness of the complexity of the historically located and socially embedded subject who makes moral judgments. I conclude by arguing that, while the two positions do not perfectly converge, Kantian morality and cultural pluralism stand much more closely to one another than has been imagined.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.017 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.012 | 0.080 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.017 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.009 |
| Research integrity | 0.007 | 0.015 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".