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Record W7132895953

Disjunctive Dreams: An Analysis of Jean-Paul Sartre's Influence on the Modern Imagination Model of Dreaming and Why Modern Disjunctivism Would Improve the Case

2024· dissertation· W7132895953 on OpenAlexfundno aff
Valerie May Bernard

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace · 2024
Typedissertation
Language
FieldPsychology
TopicPhenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersUniversity of Toronto
KeywordsPhenomenology (philosophy)AppealPerceptionArgument (complex analysis)Subject (documents)Turning pointThought experiment
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

There is a debate as to whether dreamed experience is similar or different in kind from perceptual experience. Proponents of the latter view, imagination model theorists like McGinn and Ichikawa, draw their arguments from Jean-Paul Sartre who argues that perception and imagination are sui generis mental activities. However, these proponents accept Sartre’s arguments without subjecting them to critical analysis. As such, they reproduce what I argue is a methodological problem that makes Sartre’s and his proponents’ argument vulnerable to critique. Sartre seeks to add aspects of relationalism to his phenomenological account of perception and imagination. He argues that perception is distinguished from imagination because only the former involves an encounter with a present and existing object. However, in making this case, he adheres to the phenomenological epoché which precludes an appeal to mind-independent reality and requires that he make his case solely upon subjective experience. As a result, his theory struggles to explain the phenomenology of presence in dreams, a point opponents of the Sartre-inspired imagination model use against it. Rather sticking with the phenomenological epoché, I propose that imagination model proponents fine-tune Sartre’s account of dreaming to include modern disjunctivist arguments. Disjunctivism distinguishes between two kinds of experiences, ones where the subject perceives her environment, and ones where she is imagining (hallucinating, dreaming, etc). It grants that an imaginative experience can be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptual experience while maintaining that perception and imagination are sui generis, something Sartre and his proponents struggle to account for. However, disjunctivism requires an appeal to mind-independent reality to make its case and is thus incompatible with the phenomenological epoché. Sartre offers a robust account of dreamed experience in contrast to perceptual experience. However, his attempt to combine a relationalist theory of perception with the phenomenological epoché presents serious challenges to his account of dreamed experience. While Sartre himself would be loath to abandon the epoché, I argue that modern imagination model proponents need not be. Adopting disjunctivism gives the view’s proponents a more solid foundation from which to defend the Sartrean claim that dreamed experience is different in kind from perception.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.036

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0040.014
Scholarly communication0.0040.006
Open science0.0010.004
Research integrity0.0020.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.043
GPT teacher head0.369
Teacher spread0.326 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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