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Record W7132966312

The Politics of Moral Hazard in International Finance

2024· dissertation· W7132966312 on OpenAlexfundno aff
William O'Connell

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace · 2024
Typedissertation
Language
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGlobal Financial Regulation and Crises
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersBNP Paribas CardifRoyal Bank of CanadaHSBC Bank USA
KeywordsMoral hazardTechnocracyPoliticsCorporate governanceSovereigntyTransnational governanceGlobal governanceInternational regimeExternalityFinancial integration
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This dissertation examines the politics of moral hazard through the development of international standards for managing cross-border bank failures following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. It addresses two questions. First, why did the post-2008 regime for resolving cross-border banks take on the form that it did, and how has this regime evolved over time? More broadly, how does technocratic governance develop, and what are its implications for global economic integration? In answering these questions, the dissertation develops a theory for understanding the construction of hidden regimes in global governance through a process of bricolage and translation. When delegated responsibility for fundamentally political problems, transnational regulators design hidden regimes by borrowing policy tools from adjacent domains and translating political questions of distribution and sovereignty into technical puzzles about rules and procedures. They do so through two channels: developing arcane regulations which alter the costs and benefits of cooperation, and establishing social practices which foster trust via routine interaction. Such regimes can serve to embed fiscal burden sharing among states in the absence of binding cooperative agreement. However, when economies become too integrated these contingent arrangements can break down. Under these conditions, the externalities of market failure necessitate deeper commitments, otherwise the regime may grow incoherent or ineffective. These insights are developed through three case studies: failed efforts to develop standards for resolving global banks before 2008; a successful effort to develop such standards after 2008 at the global level through the Financial Stability Board; and the uneven transposition of those global standards within the European Banking Union. These case studies are based on archival research and semi-structured interviews with current and former regulators, as well as private sector officials. The results suggest that surface-level failures to end the “too-big-to-fail” problem have masked a significant deepening of international cooperation behind the scenes, which raises questions about accountability and legitimacy in the global governance of moral hazard. While the empirical analysis is limited to the domain of international finance, the results have implications for other spheres of global governance given the increasing tendency for policy to be delegated to informal technocratic networks.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.020
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.031
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.020
Threshold uncertainty score0.108

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0200.031
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0070.046
Scholarly communication0.0100.009
Open science0.0010.007
Research integrity0.0060.010
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.028
GPT teacher head0.304
Teacher spread0.276 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2024
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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