Bibliographic record
Abstract
Relative Identity theorists (such as Geach 1967, 1980; Garbacz 2002; Griffin 1977, and Zemach 1972) claim, while Absolute Identity theorists (such as Wiggins 1967, 2001; Feldman 1981; Hawthorne 2005, and Lowe 2009) deny, that a statement of identity may be true relative to one sortal term (perhaps`statue'), but false relative to another (perhaps `clay'). Typical defenses of Relative Identity have been along the following lines: (i) Absolute Identity cannot be non-circularly defined, and (ii) there are prima-facie cases of Relative Identity in the world (Geach 1962, 1980; Griffin 1972). Both defenses fall short. The Absolute Identity theorist's response to (i) is to note that some of our concepts are basic\textemdash they are not definable in other terms (Hawthorne 2005). The Absolute Identity theorist's response to (ii) is to explain away the purported cases of Relative Identity. I argue that Relative Identity is superior to Absolute Identity because it better captures what we want out of the concept of identity than Absolute Identity does. In Chapter 1, I outline the commitments of Relative Identity, and set up the rest of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I discuss standards for a good theory of identity. In Chapter 3, I argue that Relative Identity is consistent. \par In Chapter 4, I reply to the worry that Relative Identity is reducible to Absolute Identity and that Absolute Identity therefore plays the role of "real" identity. I argue that to the extent that Relative Identity is reducible to Absolute Identity, Absolute Identity is also reducible to Relative Identity. In Chapter 5, I argue, further, that Relative Identity ought to be considered more fundamental than Absolute Identity. In chapter 6, examine the most controversial aspect of my account of Relative Identity: that objects may be identical in one circumstance but distinct in another. Typically, this would have the counter-intuitive consequence that an object's existence is insufficient for its self-identity. I argue that Relative Identity circumvents this outcome. In Chapter 7, I use the standards of a good theory of identity identified in Chapter 2 to argue that Relative Identity deserves the title of `identity.'
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".