Bibliographic record
Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on the economic consequences of a number of primarily non-market institutions, more precisely visual artists' compensation scheme, religiosity and social influence. Methodology varies across the different chapters of this thesis: I use experimental, empirical and theoretical tools. In its contents this thesis contributes to the growing efforts made by scholars and researchers to build a bridge among social science disciplines, mainly psychology, sociology and law with economics. In my first essay I model a work of art as a lottery in order to compare the two dominant compensation schemes for visual artists (painters and sculptures): with or without resale royalty. After the analysis of the experimental data I find that, in accordance with my conjecture, a number of behavioural biases in decision under uncertainty are present in resale royalty regime. I conclude that resale royalty influences not only production and selling decisions of artists but also their welfare. In the second paper using the Ethnic Diversity Survey, I examine how religious belief and practice relate to earnings in Canada. I consider the impact of the degree of religiosity using a composite score-based variable constructed by means of several questions in the survey. I also examine cross-religion differential in earnings and human capital return. I find that Jews enjoy a premium and Muslims' earnings are significantly lower compared to the average. I find that the lower return to experience of Muslims explains a large portion of their earnings gap and it is caused by the immigrant status of their great majority. My third essay proposes a modified version for the replicator equation. The replicator equation, originally conceived in evolutionary biology, is routinely used for modelling the evolution of preferences and social norms, conceived through population proportions of types. My proposed version incorporates the components of social influence into the equation not only making the justification for its use in economics more solid but also it helps providing an explanation for some observed socioeconomic patterns that could not be otherwise explained.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.014 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".