An Authoritarian System that Sells Power: How China's Economic Reform Fosters a Modern Authoritarian State
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The sequence of Chinese reforms has a major overall effect on the political and social landscape of the country. To some extent, economic development is certainly a push- pull factor that makes China move toward or deviate from the path of political liberalization. In the case of China, as this paper proposes, it deviates from the development experience of the four Asian tigers, where economy growth has lead to the emerging institutional basis for each country’s intellectual pluralism and informal institutions. In other words, two-decades of economic reform have made China an exception that is immune to the political vulnerabilities and legitimacy crisis that most Eastern European socialist economies experienced during the transition period. The basic reason is that Chinese state-led development strategies generate unfavorable exogenous factors upon the path to democratic transition. China’s dual-track system, state-led capital allocation, tax assignment system reform, and preferential treatment not only perpetuate state control, but also institutionalize state opportunism and corruption. Reform promotes the interests of the ruling elite, newly vested interest groups, and those who align themselves with the State in exchange the preservation of their special positions. For the same reason, Chinese entrepreneurs are not advocating for political change; they represent majority of the vast interest groups in pursuing of their self-interest as well as maintaining the favorable political status quo. To a large degree, China’s private entrepreneurs are keen to maintain guanxi with the State to procure permits and business opportunities. From the top down, the Chinese Communist Party has shown incredible adaptability to accommodate changing societal needs and values to gain public support. In China, membership privilege is the sine qua non to ascend the political ladder. Party affiliation not only opens the door for career opportunities, but also allows access to political resources for economic gain. In all, the regime gains loyalty by rewarding those that collaborate with it. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party holds tight control over personnel appointment and the cadre system throughout government and state-owned enterprises. For the elite, the best way to climb up the social ladder is to get closer to the Party organizations. My paper argues that in the foreseeable future the Chinese Communist Party will continue to highlight the priority of the country’s economic development, social harmony and stability, which enable the regime to hold a political monopoly.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.010 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".