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4,299,418 works, Canadian by any of four routes.

Every filter state is a URL; the URL is the query; the query is citable via /q/⟨hash⟩. The page, the API and the export parse the same parameters.

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The current cohort, streamed from the database: every work column, the machine labels, the provisional scores, and the per-row validation status. Exports are capped at 100,000 rows. Mints a permanent /q/ link for this exact query. The same filters always produce the same link, whoever asks.

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Auction Theory and Applications
Retraction
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Direct Codex and Gemma labels are unvalidated and sparse. Distilled predictions cover the full frame and are also unvalidated. Choose the evidence source explicitly; absence of a direct label is never a negative label.

affaffiliation
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The four routes compose: require the funder route and exclude affiliation to get the funder-only stratum no affiliation-based frame ever sees.

1,300 results · 1 filter active ·
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20002025
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Machine labels · sparse coverage
Evidence
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An unlabeled work is unknown, not a negative. Label coverage is reported on every query.
1,300 works in the cohort · of 4,299,418page 1 of 26

Labels cover 1 of 1,300 works in this cohort. The rest are unlabeled, which is not a negative label: the label table is sparse today and grows as labeling rounds land.

Distilled predictions cover 1,300 of 1,300 works in this cohort. Predictions are machine_predicted_unvalidated. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work (title-only); the Codex side is a distilled, calibrated classifier. Candidate is the union; consensus is the intersection.

affunlabeled
Multiagent Systems
Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton‐Brown
2008· book· en· Cambridge University Press eBooks· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
920
citations
affunlabeled
Misselling through Agents
Roman Inderst, Marco Ottaviani
2009· article· en· American Economic Review· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
393
citations
affunlabeled
Reputation and Competition
Johannes Höner
2002· article· en· American Economic Review· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
345
citations
affno abstractunlabeled
Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain
Christian Catalini, Joshua S. Gans
2016· article· en· SSRN Electronic Journal· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
240
citations
affunlabeled
Persuasion by Cheap Talk
Archishman Chakraborty, Rick Harbaugh
2010· article· en· American Economic Review· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
226
citations
affunlabeled
Large Robust Games
Ehud Kalai
2004· article· en· Econometrica· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
200
citations
affunlabeled
The effect of discretion on procurement performance
Decio Coviello, Andrea Guglielmo, Giancarlo Spagnolo
2018· article· en· Cineca Institutional Research Information System (Tor Vergata University)· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
180
citations
affunlabeled
Falling Flat
J. P. Eggers
2012· article· en· Administrative Science Quarterly· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · insufficient_payloadconsensus · none
172
citations
aboutno affno abstractunlabeled
The Montreal Taxonomy for Electronic Negotiations
Michael Ströbel, Christof Weinhardt
2003· article· en· Group Decision and Negotiation· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
168
citations
affunlabeled
Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions
Timothy G. Conley, Francesco Decarolis
2016· article· en· American Economic Journal Microeconomics· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
151
citations
affunlabeled
Discriminatory Information Disclosure
Hao Li, Xianwen Shi
2017· article· en· American Economic Review· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
131
citations
affunlabeled
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
Gregory Pavlov
2011· article· en· The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
123
citations
affunlabeled
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier
2010· article· en· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
115
citations
affunlabeled
Empirical hardness models
Kevin Leyton‐Brown, Eugene Nudelman, Yoav Shoham
2009· article· en· Journal of the ACM· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
110
citations
affunlabeled
Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions
Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin
2010· article· en· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
97
citations
affunlabeled
A Secondary Market for Spectrum
Hong Xu, Jin Jin, Baochun Li
2010· article· en· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
96
citations
affunlabeled
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, Rakesh Vohra
2008· article· en· Econometrica· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
93
citations
affunlabeled
Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets
Jeffrey C. Ely, Tanjim Hossain
2009· article· en· American Economic Journal Microeconomics· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
88
citations
affunlabeled
Online algorithms for market clearing
Avrim Blum, Tüomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich
2006· article· en· Journal of the ACM· Decision Sciences
machine prediction:candidate · noneconsensus · none
82
citations
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