Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract As conventional trade barriers fall, nations may increasingly resort to product standards to protect domestic industries. While ostensibly protecting their citizens from the environmental and health side-effects of a particular product, countries could enact standards that are facially-neutral, but impose greater compliance costs on foreign producers. This paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on standard setting by using a two-country Cournot duopoly model in which the Domestic government imposes a standard to mitigate a consumption externality. The standard increases production costs for both Domestic and Foreign firms, especially for the latter. The paper finds that one cannot make an unequivocal connection between falling tariffs and subsidies and rising standards. If the initial tariffs or subsidies are prohibitive, reducing subsidies and tariffs to allow minimal import penetration will generally create incentives for the Domestic government to impose higher standards. If the ex ante tariffs are not prohibitive, however, it is only optimal for the government to raise standards following tariff cuts if (i) tariff revenues are an important component of the welfare calculus and the ex ante tariff rate is high, or (ii) the standard's effect on the per unit externality is large. Likewise, if the initial subsidies are small enough to allow imports the government should only raise standards following subsidy reductions if the per unit externality is substantial, or the standard's impact on the per unit externality is large.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".