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Record W2093574114 · doi:10.2308/ajpt-51018

Does Disclosure of Conflict of Interest Increase or Decrease Bias?

2015· article· en· W2093574114 on OpenAlexaff
Karim Jamal, Erin E. Marshall, Hun‐Tong Tan

Bibliographic record

VenueAuditing A Journal of Practice & Theory · 2015
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicAuditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Canadian institutionsUniversity of LethbridgeUniversity of Alberta
Fundersnot available
KeywordsConflict of interestIncentiveAuditAccountingValuation (finance)BusinessCorporate governanceDutyAuditor independenceIndependence (probability theory)Actuarial scienceEconomicsPolitical scienceMicroeconomicsLawFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

SUMMARY Corporate governance reforms and the threat-safeguard approach to auditor independence regulations are motivated by the assumption that disclosure by an agent (e.g., auditor) of a potential conflict of interest reduces bias in professional judgment. In this study, we conduct an experiment using experienced professional valuators to investigate the validity of this assumption. We find that where the nature of the conflict is aligned with the interests of the current client, disclosure of a conflict of interest actually increases bias in participants' valuation estimates in favor of the current client. However, when there is an incentive to act against the interest of the current client, the valuator signals his/her duty to the current client by moving valuations in favor of (and not against) the current client. In this case, disclosure has no incremental effect in reducing or exacerbating bias.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.300
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.843
Threshold uncertainty score0.706

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.300
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.003
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.059
GPT teacher head0.290
Teacher spread0.232 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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